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Abstract 
The paper analyses the dual form of striving for a good life underlying Aristotle’s 
distinction between “human” and “divine” lives. The paper explores this theme 
with regard to the close connection between ethics and politics inherent in 
Aristotle’s analyses, focusing primarily on the specific relationship between 
politics and philosophy outlined in this connection in Book X of Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. The distinction between political and philosophical life is 
interpreted not as a definition of two different life contents we are to choose from, 
but as a definition of two attitudes or perspectives our lives can be approached 
from – either from the perspective of a variety of different types of actions 
performed in the social space, or with regard to the unifying element binding our 
life together reflexively in a coherent whole. Taking into account the relevant 
principles of Aristotelian anthropology, the paper demonstrates that philosophical 
contemplation thus conceived is already grounded in political life and it does not 
stand against it as an option of some “other” life released from socio-political ties. 
The proposed interpretation makes it possible to alleviate the tension in Aristotle’s 
concept of political and philosophical life and thereby support a more coherent 
reading of the conclusion of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
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Aristotle’s reflexion on the dual form of striving for a good life and his 
distinction between “human” and “divine” lives was one of his important 
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contributions to ethical discussion taking place in ancient Greece. In my 
paper I am going to deal with this subject with regard to the close 
connection between ethics and politics, focusing primarily on the specific 
relationship between politics and philosophy outlined in Book X of 
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
  
1. The Two Best Lives 
Aristotle’s distinction between “human” and “divine” lives in the last 
book of the Nicomachean Ethics appears in the context of the search for 
human happiness, i.e. a successful or happy life (eudaimonia), which 
frames the ethical exploration in this treatise1. The initial definition of 
happiness as “activity of soul exhibiting virtue” (NE 1098a 17) is also 
evoked in the concluding passages of Book X which are going to be the 
immediate subject of our exploration:  
 
If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue (energeia kat’ aretên), it is 
reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be 
that of the best thing in us. Whether it be reason or something else that is this 
element which is thought to be our natural ruler and guide and to take thought of 
things noble and divine, whether it be itself also divine or only the most divine 
element in us, the activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will be 
perfect happiness (NE 1177a 11-18)2. 
 
Drawing on this definition, Aristotle goes on to present a more precise 
distinction between the relevant activities, distinguishing between the two 
kinds of life these activities represent: on the one hand there is “life 
according to reason” (kata ton nûn bios), hereafter called divine life, on 
the other hand there is “life according to the other virtues” (kata tên allên 
                                                 
1 For the conception of eudaimonia, see e.g. LEAR 2009. 
2 Quotations from the Nicomachean Ethics are taken from the translation by D. Ross 
(ARISTOTLE 2009). Quotations from the Policics  are taken from the translation by H. 
Rackham (ARISTOTLE 1959). 
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aretên), hereafter called human life. The distinction between the two lives 
also implies a corresponding value hierarchy: 
 
…that which is proper to each thing is by nature best and most pleasant for each 
thing; for man, therefore, the life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since 
reason more than anything else is man. This life therefore is also the happiest. But 
in a secondary degree the life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy 
(NE 1178a 6-10). 
 
This distinction is further supported by a reference to the composite 
character of human nature, containing an emotional component as well as 
a rational one (NE 1178a 19-23). Therefore, the two types of life 
represent two types of happiness, and, in a way that is at first sight 
unexpected, they dualise Aristotle’s answer to the question of a good life 
that the whole treatise revolves around. 
Aristotle is intentionally brief in distinguishing the two kinds of 
happiness, and hence the closing passages of the Nicomachean Ethics 
understandably attract the attention of interpreters, especially for the 
following reasons: the whole Nicomachean Ethics is placed in the political 
context and it deals with issues of action within human community, i.e. 
within the polis. The opening passages explicitly emphasize the political 
grounding of ethics (NE I 2) and the political interest in ethical education 
(NE I 9; I 13). Similarly, its ending also supports this connection, 
referring in its last chapter to the legislative framework of ethical 
education (NE X 9), thereby creating a natural transition to a treatise on 
political matters, i.e. the Politics. Therefore, Aristotle’s interest seems to 
be directed primarily towards the political sphere. His exploration is 
explicitly focused on the realm of praxis, i.e. it does not strive for a mere 
theoretical handling of a problem, but maps the space for action and turns 
to those who act in that space, actively entering political affairs (NE 
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1095a)3. This is the sphere in which Aristotle’s addressees are to attest 
their qualities. 
 
Taking into account that Aristotle’s ethics is so obviously evolving on 
the platform of the polis, the ethical virtues Aristotle is dealing with can at 
the same time be called political virtues, and “life according to the other 
virtues” can be paraphrased as political life: “the activity of the practical 
virtues is exhibited in political or military affairs” (NE 1177b 6-7). On the 
other hand, “life according to reason” can be paraphrased as theoretical or 
contemplative life, i.e. philosophical life4.  
The accentuation of theoretical life coming in Chapters 7 and 8 of Book 
X, where it is explicitly accredited supremacy over political life, may, 
however, seem surprising, disturbing or downright paradoxical within the 
whole of Aristotle’s proceedings. Accordingly, interpreters are not 
unanimous on the reading of Book X, disagreeing on the issue of the 
mutual relationship between the two types of the “best lives” as well as 
the overall consistency of Aristotle’s treatment of these motives. A 
number of authors emphasize the tensions within Aristotle’s conception5, 
suggesting a whole range of interpretations to cope with these tensions6. 
                                                 
3 This orientation of the Nicomachean Ethics is emphasized e.g. by OʼCONNOR 1999, 
109: «Aristotle’s primary addressee is a man driven by ambition, an ambition that 
manifests itself fundamentally if not ultimately in politics. Aristotle issues an invitation to 
virtue that is aimed specifically at such ambitious men». 
4 However, I do not think we can understand this term as vita contemplativa, either in the 
sense of the medieval concept of contemplatio or in the sense of the modern distinction 
vita contemplativa / vita activa.  
5 See for example URMSON 1995, NUSSBAUM 2001. 
6 A review of research on this issue is presented by GOTLIEB 2009. As far as Czech 
research is concerned, a recent study written by Stanislav Synek retains a certain tension 
in the relationship between the two lives: «it is not clear whether man is more an 
individual being whose highest and most meaningful realisation rests in self-sufficient 
contemplation (theôria) with minimal dependence on the life of the community, or 
whether man is more a “naturally” social being whose happiness depends on the 
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In my paper I am going to try and moderate the paradoxical impression 
of the concluding passages of the Nicomachean Ethics and to show that 
politics and contemplation in Aristotle’s concept do not stand next to one 
another as two disparate activities but, on the contrary, are connected by a 
very specific relationship. 
 
2. The Choice of a Life? 
First of all, let us take a look at whether Aristotle’s distinction between 
“life according to reason” (kata ton nûn bios) and “life according to the 
other virtues” (kata tên allên aretên) should be understood as a distinction 
between two life alternatives inviting us to choose one of two ways of life, 
on the one hand offering a life devoted to activity within the polis 
exercizing a wide range of ethical virtues, and on the other hand a life 
devoted to contemplation, remote from political affairs. These two “lives” 
are presented in Aristotle’s work as serious candidates for a good life. 
Strictly speaking, there is one more candidate, i.e. the life dedicated to 
pleasure; that is, however, degraded in Aristotle’s treatise to a position of 
a less-than-human life, “the life of cattle”7. Therefore, although Aristotle 
proceeds from the trichotomy of life alternatives commonly accepted in 
public opinion and including the life of pleasure, the political life and the 
                                                                                                                            
happiness of others and therefore cannot be achieved without a “good” or “happy” 
company of other people. This indicates the limitations of the whole of Aristotle’s 
concept: the impossibility of uniting human and divine perspectives, and hence the 
impossibility of satisfactorily answering the initial question what practicable human 
happiness really is» (SYNEK 2011, 239, translation is mine). Nevertheless, Synek 
immediately acknowledges certain dynamics this tension brings to Aristotle’s concept of 
the realisation of human nature. 
7 As far as the value of pleasure in human life is concerned, let us refer to a more 
sophisticated analysis in Book VII and X of the Nicomachean Ethics, which shows that 
pleasure is not to be completely dismissed from human life and examines its appropriate 
role  more comprehensively. 
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philosophical life (NE 1095b 15-19)8, in fact he works with the dichotomy 
of political and philosophical lives. Do the two members of this 
dichotomy, however, stand before us as objects of a life choice? Is it 
possible to choose one before the other? 
On this matter let us first mention that the motif of the choice of a way 
of life is well known in classical tradition and it has been the subject of a 
number of literary treatments. One of the examples is Prodicus’s allegory 
Hercules at the Crossroads, where the proposed alternatives one of which 
Hercules is to choose at the threshold of his adulthood are a comfortable 
life of pleasure and a life based on virtue, accompanied, however, by pain 
and striving (Xenophon, Mem. II 1, 21-34)9. The motif is also presented 
by Plato, who deals with the question of the choice of life in his dialogues 
Gorgias, Apology of Socrates or Republic. In the Apology he presents a 
distinction between two kinds of life aspiration: one of them is aimed at 
money, reputation and honour, and the other one is aimed at reason, truth 
and the cultivation of the soul (Apol. 29d-30b). In Gorgias the question in 
what way one should live is asked explicitly, and two life possibilities are 
suggested the requirements of which we have to consider with all due 
responsibility: on the one hand a life devoted to active involvement in 
political sphere, where actions are accompanied by honour and credit, on 
the other hand a life devoted to philosophy (Gorg. 500b-d). With peculiar 
gravity the motif of the life choice is incorporated in the concluding 
passage in Book X of the Republic. Here we encounter the soul of man on 
the threshold of a new birth facing the necessity of choosing not one of 
two alternatives, but one of a whole range of possible lives. This choice is 
irreversible and with all gravity it makes man once and for all responsible 
for who he is. (Resp. 617d-621b). 
                                                 
8 The idea of three ways of life corresponding to the threefold structure of the soul is also 
elaborated by Plato (Resp. 436a-441c, cf. Resp. 586a-e). 
9 The allegory was modelled on a passage from the Works and Days by Hesiod (Hesiod, 
Op. 287-292). 
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For further elaboration of our subject matter it should be noted in this 
place that Plato at the same time indicates the serious pitfalls of the 
precarious situation of the soul. The choice of a destiny may be carried out 
blindly and impetuously, which is characteristically demonstrated already 
in the case of the first chooser, who inconsiderately reaches for the life of a 
tyrant, not realising in time the horrible deeds accompanying that kind of 
life. It is very telling that the unfortunate choice is performed by the soul 
of a man who had lived his previous life decently, but – and this is crucial 
– it was a decency based only on habit, not on philosophical 
understanding (aneu filosofias, Resp. 619d 1)10. 
Coming back to Aristotle, we may ask the question whether also Book 
X of the Nicomachean Ethics should be read in the light of the indicated 
text tradition. Are the two lives – political and philosophical – alternatives 
for the choice of the way of life? I think such a reading would be 
inaccurate, especially considering Aristotle’s understanding of choice. 
Aristotle deals with the issue of choice (prohairesis) extensively in his 
ethical theory, but instead of the idea of absolute choice determining the 
whole of our existence he employs the idea of relative choice, i.e. 
preferential choice presupposing selection and preceding deliberation11. 
That is why in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics he repeatedly 
emphasises that choice concerns the means, not the ends. Therefore, we 
choose the means or ways of certain actions, but not the end itself that we 
act for. However, the choice of a life would be a choice of an end. Unlike 
the Platonic vision saying that “the choice of a different life 
inevitably determined a different character” (Resp. 618b), Aristotle 
                                                 
10  It should be noted that under closer examination the position of Plato reveals a number of 
parallels and a deeper congruence with Aristotle. When Plato distinguishes sharply 
between different „lives“ in various passages of his dialogues, he prepares a ground for a 
deeper examination of the relationship between politics and philosophy, which prove to 
coincide in the person of a philosopher considered as a true politician. In this context see 
especially Gorgias 484c-521d, Theaitetus 173c-176b and Republic VI-VII. 
11 See NUSSBAUM 2001, 307 and nn. 
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assumes that it is particular ways of acting that are the objects of choice, 
and they are constitutive of human character (NE 1114a 9). That 
corresponds to his understanding of responsibility for the way of life we 
lead. In the Aristotelian perspective we are not “what we choose to be 
once and for all, but what we choose to do at each moment”12.  
3. Distinguishing Life Perspectives 
Having clarified this, we can proceed to considering the value of the 
two ways of life and asking about the criteria we use when distinguishing 
between them. Let us begin with Aristotle’s question (NE 1178a 34-35) 
whether intention, or, more precisely, deliberate choice (prohairesis), is 
more important for virtue than actions (praxeis). Aristotle himself answers 
this question by a repeated reference to the idea that what determines the 
nature of ethical conduct is, above all, deliberate choice: “it is thought to 
be most closely bound up with virtue, and to discriminate characters better 
than actions do” (NE 1111b 5; cf. 1112 a2-3). This conviction 
corresponds to the distinction between the external and internal character 
of action, and Aristotle demonstrates it in several places, e.g. by his 
reminder that it is not enough to perform just actions, but it is necessary to 
perform these actions as a just man, i.e. as one who decides and acts with 
regard to the principles of ethical conduct (NE 1105a 30-1105b 9; cf. NE 
1144a 13-21).  Conditions of ethically valuable action are specified in the 
following way:  
 
…if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain 
character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent 
also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must 
have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own 
sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character 
(NE 1105a 28-34). 
 
                                                 
12 AUBENQUE 1963, 152. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2016.2664
Human and Divine Lives in Book X of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
Π Η Γ Η / F O N S   I  (2016), 1-20 9 
 
At the same time, the nature of ethical conduct is based on practical 
wisdom, phronêsis, i.e. the ability to discover in the changeable 
constellations of our lives the optimal way of responding to the challenges 
of the situations we find ourselves in. The structure of conduct then 
involves a cooperation of the ability to find appropriate ways of behaviour 
with the ability to orientate these ways towards the overall course of our 
life: virtue is responsible for aiming at the correct goal, and practical 
wisdom then in the light of this goal chooses the correct means leading to 
it (NE 1144a 8-9)13. It should be noted that what we mean by “means” 
here are particular ways of acting which in particular situations in specific 
ways fulfil our idea of how we should act to make our life successful. 
The distinction between a deliberate choice and an act enables Aristotle 
to outline the nature of ethical conduct more sharply and contrast it with 
activities having the character of technê rather than praxis. While the 
result of technê is assessed on the basis of a certain task having been 
performed, ethical conduct is assessed not only according to the external 
appearance of the act in question, but mainly according to what inner 
disposition is enacted in the actual choices of the agent.  
As Aristotle comes back to these constituents of virtue in Book X, 
asking once again what the role of deliberate choice is and what that of the 
action itself, the question posed in this way can be an important clue for 
grasping the relationship between philosophical and political lives, 
because different answers to it open up different perspectives regarding 
this relationship. From the perspective of actions political and 
philosophical lives are different in their contents, are different in the 
nature of the activities performed. The difference between the two ways of 
life would, from this perspective, lie in the difference between their actual 
contents.  
However, the external appearance of an action, as we have seen, is not 
the only criterion. Activities can be evaluated not only in terms of what 
                                                 
13 On this issue, cf. MOSS 2011. 
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we do, but also in terms of what principles we are following while 
performing them, i.e. what we act for. Introducing the perspective of 
purposes and aims then also makes it possible to form a different structure 
of the relationship between political and philosophical lives. The 
difference will not consist in the different contents but in the overall 
orientation of life. 
Political life could be characterized as life aimed at a wide range of 
particular ethical virtues set in the framework of social coexistence. 
Philosophical life, i.e. life lived from the position of theôria, would, in 
contrast, offer a higher measure of integration of individual activities in the 
whole of life, relating these activities to the unity of a single happy life14. 
I think this distinction may help us achieve a less tense interpretation of 
Aristotle’s understanding of the relationship between political and 
philosophical lives, offering the conception of politics and philosophy as 
two attitudes or perspectives our lives can be approached from – once 
from the perspective of a multitude of various types of action performed in 
the social space, once with regard to the unifying element binding our life 
together reflexively in a coherent whole. 
What appears on the outside as the same life can therefore be lived 
either philosophically or politically, depending on the understanding of the 
agent. The difference between political and philosophical life would then 
be based not on different contents of the lives in question but on different 
perspectives from which a person views his or her actions. Therefore, it is 
not a distinction between two different types of life, but rather a distinction 
                                                 
14 «In the political life, the dominant attention and value remains with the individual 
virtuous actions. The contemplative life places attention and value on the single happy 
life made up of these parts. When many good actions are fully integrated into one happy 
life, then one is living theoretically…» (GARVER 2006, 196).  
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between two ways of approaching one’s life coexisting in a particular life 
of an individual15. 
Distinguishing the two elements coexisting in one life16 well 
corresponds to Aristotle’s reflections on a happy life, i.e. eudaimonia. 
Formal characteristics of eudaimonia include “perfection” and “self-
sufficiency”: “Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and 
is the end of action” (NE 1097b 20-21). That suggests the question: in 
what sense can our life be as perfect and complete as to manifest the 
quality of eudaimonia? This perfection or completeness can be understood 
in terms of time, which is a possibility that Aristotle explores in the first 
book of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he, however, at the same time 
highlights the obvious paradoxes the time perspective necessarily results 
in: we could not call anyone a happy man until his death, when he finally 
escapes any possible twists of fate; nevertheless, even after his death he 
can be troubled by unfortunate events befalling his offspring, etc. 
Therefore, it is more appropriate to relate eudaimonia to a different type of 
holistic understanding of life.  
                                                 
15 «Note that on the interpretation of 10.6-8 as giving an outline of happiness, we do not 
take the phrases ‘a life lived according to the mind’ (or philosophical wisdom) (1177b30) 
or ‘a life lived according to the other virtues’ (1177a21) to mean separate ways of life, or 
possible bibliographies, but rather ways of carrying on with life, which coexist in the life 
of one individual» (PAKALUK 2005, 327). Pakaluk immediately goes on to explain how 
he imagines this coexistence: «Aristotle when lecturing in philosophy is living ‘life 
according to the mind’, and when he is writing his will, and exercising  administrative 
virtue and justice, he is living ‘life according to the other virtues’. Those phrases should 
be taken to indicate types of activity» (PAKALUK 2005, 327). For an opposite view 
arguing that «the theoretical life and the ‘life in accordance with the other virtue’ (1178a 
6–9) are competing alternatives, and not two aspects of the same life», see LEAR 2004, 
177 and nn. 
16 In this sense, a man applying ethical virtue and a man devoting himself to contemplation 
«are not two different persons; rather, it is one and the same person on different levels of 
excellence» (AUBENQUE 2003, 98). 
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Again, we can begin with the distinction between technê as 
instrumental activity aiming to an external result, and praxis as activity 
performed with a consciousness of the purpose and a full awareness of the 
activity itself, with the purpose being not the external “product” but the 
activity itself. 
We realise that our life is never fully completed in the form of a perfect 
actualisation lying in front of us as a completed “product”. We are on the 
way to this actualisation and in this sense our life is more an aiming, not a 
fulfilment. In spite of that, we may be able to view our life as a whole. 
This complete view can be best achieved in certain self-reflexive acts 
allowing us a sort of an intellectual insight in what we are doing17. It is 
this self-reflection accompanied by self-awareness that brings the 
necessary stability and unity to our life:  
 
The attribute in question [i.e. permanence],  then, will belong to the happy 
man, and he will be happy throughout his life; for always, or by preference to 
everything else, he will do and contemplate what is excellent (praxei kai theôrêsei 
ta kat’ aretên)… (NE 1100b 18-20)18. 
 
The quoted formulation explicitly underlines the connection between 
praxis and theôria, and Aristotle further elaborates this connection in 
                                                 
17 «…if he who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who 
walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there is something 
which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we perceive that we perceive, 
and if we think, that we think; and if to perceive that we perceive or think is to perceive 
that we exist (for existence was defined as perceiving or thinking)…» (NE 1170a 29-b 1). 
18 Cf. NE 1152a 15-17. Referring to the nature of ethical virtues, M. Pakaluk says: «their 
being goals somehow involves our being able to reflect upon or see them with reasonable 
satisfaction; this is not philosophical contemplation strictly, but some kind of intellectual 
perception, presumably of the kalon, namely what is admirable and attractive in action. It 
must be Aristotle’s view ultimately that to carry out a fitting action is somehow to see 
that it is fitting, and that our seeing that it is so is the best part of the action, and that there 
is no point to life beyond seeing in this way» (PAKALUK 2005, 328). Cf. RORTY 1978, 
346. 
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Book IX, determining as  appropriate objects of theôria not only our own 
actions, but even more so the actions of our friends in whom we see 
ourselves, so to speak19: 
 
If happiness lies in living and being active, and the good man’s activity is 
virtuous and pleasant in itself, as we have said at the outset, and a thing’s being 
one’s own is one of the attributes that make it pleasant, and we can contemplate 
our neighbours better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and if 
the actions of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to good men (since 
these have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant) — if this be so, the 
supremely happy man will need friends of this sort, since his purpose is to 
contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a good 
man who is his friend have both these qualities (NE 1169b 30-1170a 4)20. 
 
If the range of objects of contemplation is conceived in this way, it may 
also suggest a clue for a better understanding of the meaning of theôria, 
described in Book X as the highest and most divine activity.  
We know that divine life consists in contemplating oneself. Which 
human activity would then be the most divine? It might be the 
contemplation of the divine, meaning we would try as much as we could 
to contemplate the same that god is contemplating.  This concept of 
                                                 
19 For a broader context, see NE 1169b 14-1170a 5. On the political character of 
friendship, cf. GARVER 2006, 141. 
20 The role of friendship in connection with the awareness of oneself is further elaborated in 
the passage following the extract quoted in Note 17: «…if perceiving that one lives is in 
itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to perceive what is 
good present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is desirable, and particularly so for good 
men, because to them existence is good and pleasant (for they are pleased at the 
consciousness of the presence in them of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous 
man is to himself, he is to his friend also (for his friend is another self ) — if all this be 
true, as his own being is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend. 
Now his being was seen to be desirable because he perceived his own goodness, and 
such perception is pleasant in itself. He must, therefore, perceive the existence of his 
friend together with his own, and this will be realized in their living together and sharing 
in discussion and thought…» (NE 1170b 1-12). 
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theôria would best correspond to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and the value of 
theoretical activity would in this case be derived from the value of its 
object21. However, if we place the emphasis on the reflexive aspect of 
theôria that we register in the Nicomachean Ethics, contemplating our 
own activities may be seen as the most divine activity approximating what 
god is doing: like god viewing himself, we would be viewing our own 
activity. Only in this sense what is divine could at the same time be what 
is most proper to us. 
Therefore, I think a plausible interpretation should connect both of the 
two steps mentioned before: broaden the field of contemplation to include 
a wider range of possible objects22, and at the same time revise the 
understanding of Aristotle’s concept of homoiôsis theôi, i.e. the concept 
of the imitation of the divine which is an important fundament of 
Aristotle’s ethical thinking. The perspective of the Nicomachean Ethics 
shows that this imitation does not have to be a strict imitation of divine 
activity in a purely intelligible sphere in which god as pure reason relates 
to the most valuable objects of thinking, but it can be an imitation of the 
very reflexivity theôria is connected to in the context of the Nicomachean 
Ethics. 
 
4. Phronêsis and Theôria 
Contemplation conceived in this way, then, does not need to be put 
against political life as some “other”, apolitical life. This is also intimated 
by Aristotle’s polemics with the opinion that philosophy means retreating 
                                                 
21 Theôria, in the broadest sense of “seeing” or “viewing”, denotes perfect knowledge 
related to necessary and unchangeable objects. 
22 A certain flexibility is suggested by Aristotle himself in the closing passage of Chapter 8 
in Book X, where he says that “happiness is some form of contemplation” (theôria tis). 
Hence it seems he does not mean the strictly conceived theôria of the Metaphysics. 
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from active life to seclusion and inactivity, implied in Book VII of the 
Politics23. Here is what Aristotle is saying on this: 
 
But the active life is not necessarily active in relation to other men, as some 
people think, nor are only those processes of thought active that are pursued for 
the sake of the objects that result from action, but far more those speculations and 
thoughts that have their end in themselves and are pursued for their own sake 
(Pol. 1325b 18-22). 
 
What is crucial here is the emphasis on activity, which can be internal 
as well as external in character. Taking into account this statement, we 
can go on to define more precisely the relationship between theoretical 
and political activity. Instead of making a sharp distinction between 
contemplative and political life we can say that contemplation completes 
political life and it is itself already grounded in political life: the political 
nature of man expressed by the term zôon politikon is grounded in the 
ability of speech and thinking, represented in the formula zôon logon 
echon (Pol. 1253a 10-18). Both of these terms underline the political 
character of friendship which makes our self-reflection and realising our 
own goodness possible through the reflection of the actions of another 
person, “another self” with whom we are “living together and sharing in 
discussion and thought” (NE 1170b 11-12). Both of these terms together 
demonstrate to what extent human rationality is connected to the political 
nature of man. Also, it is the space of the polis where this rationality is 
primarily manifested. A wide range of human activities require phronêsis 
which is necessary to a good life because it constitutes the rational 
structure of ethical virtue (NE 1178a 10-19).  
As the ability to relate to both the general and the particular enabling us 
to find particular ways of applying ethical virtue in the light of general 
                                                 
23 A typical exponent of the conviction about the antagonism of politics and philosophy and 
a proponent of the thesis about the inactive, and in that sense “unmanly”, nature of 
philosophy is Callicles from Plato’s dialogue Gorgias (Gorg. 485c-486d). 
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principles, phronêsis is an important bridge between practical and 
theoretical reason. In this sense, it also prepares the ground for the 
development of theôria: 
 
[Practical wisdom] is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e. over the 
superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health; for it does not 
use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders, then, for its sake, but 
not to it (NE 1145a 6-9). 
 
In what sense, then, is theôria dependent on the ability of ethical action 
within the polis? Only those endowed with phronêsis can judge the 
relative value of human activities, but above all they understand the 
activities performed for their own sake; therefore, they can see the 
difference between activities having the character of energeia and activities 
having the character of kinêsis24, and from this perspective they also view 
ethical action. Activity construed on the model of kinêsis has the nature of 
instrumental activity and its goal lies outside the activity itself25. By 
contrast, activity construed on the model of energeia is itself its own goal, 
and it is exactly this kind of activity that ethical action is, at least in its 
pure form.  
Here we can distinguish between simple virtue, which is necessary to a 
good life and is accompanied by desirable elements such as honour, power 
or social status, and nobility, which values virtue for its own sake, i.e. for 
its intrinsic value26. This is the course of the subtle analyses of the nature 
of virtue in which Aristotle distinguishes more finely between ethically 
and politically motivated virtue; an example of this is his analysis of 
courage in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he says that 
political courage of a citizen-soldier is most like courage, but it is not pure 
courage, inasmuch as it is motivated by secondary principles in the form 
                                                 
24  This distinction is suggested in the Metaphysics (Met.1048b). 
25 Cf. the distinction between virtue and cleverness (deinotês) in NE 1144a. 
26 See BROADIE 2005, 98. Cf. Eth. Eud. 1248b-1249b. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/fons.2016.2664
Human and Divine Lives in Book X of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 
Π Η Γ Η / F O N S   I  (2016), 1-20 17 
 
of public appreciation or mere obedience of the law27. The principal 
expression of this point is the note that virtue is not only kata ton orthon 
logon, but meta tû orthû logû: “it is not merely the state in accordance 
with correct reason, but the state that implies the presence of correct 
reason, that is virtue“ (NE 1144b 24-26). 
The shift between the two positions, between politically and ethically 
motivated virtues, is the result of ethical development. In the course of 
this development a range of particular actions filling the political space can 
be perceived not as a simple sum of activities constituting a good life, but 
it can be elevated to viewing the intrinsic value of virtue and related to the 
unifying perspective of a happy life as a whole, conceived also in the sense 
of energeia. A man endowed with phronêsis already has all the 
prerequisites for that.  
Further, it follows from the nature of the human being that a higher 
measure of unity is given by a higher measure of integration of diverse 
components28. Therefore, the unity of human life does not rest in 
performing the same activity all the time: “…if the nature of anything were 
simple, the same action would always be most pleasant to it.” (NE 1154b 
25-26). But that is not the case with human beings. The composite human 
nature finds its unity in a higher measure of integration connecting diverse 
activities29. The same point that is applied on the level of political life can 
thus be transferred to the level of individual life: there, too, unity is 
conceived as integration of plurality and diversity. 
                                                 
27 Here we can also follow up with a reference to the distinction between habitual and 
reflected virtue which is a part of the Socratic-Platonic heritage and was suggested above 
by the reference to the eschatological myth in Book X of the Republic. 
28 Let us remember Aristotle’s analyses of unity in the Metaphysics, where the unity of a 
heap is confronted with a higher unity of an integrated whole (Met.1052a). 
29 This should also be the disposition of the phronimos: he is the one who knows that 
isolated actions without coherence and continuity do not establish a good life (see NE 
1105a 30-34).   
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Hence, it is necessary to add one more note to the above mentioned 
principles of Aristotelian anthropology: “man is not the best thing in the 
world” (NE 1141a 21-23). His human, social activities, although they 
achieve their own perfection, still, as to their value, come second30. 
However, they form the necessary condition for the integrating theoretical 
insight into these activities. The contemplative life, therefore, does not 
release itself from social ties, as Aristotle explicitly emphasises by 
repeated references to social life being necessary to happiness (NE 1169b 
14-1170a 5; cf. 1157b 20-22; 1099b 4). Hence, the self-sufficiency of a 
happy life is not supposed to mean a solitary life:  
 
…by self-sufficient we do not mean that which is sufficient for a man by 
himself, for one who lives a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and 
in general for his friends and fellow citizens, since man is born for citizenship (NE 
1097b 8-12).  
 
Therefore, I think that on the basis of the proposed evidence it is 
possible to alleviate the tension in Aristotleìs concept of political and 
philosophical life, thus supporting a more coherent reading of the 
conclusion of the Nicomachean Ethics. It turns out that both of the two 
ways of life, or, rather, both of the two life perspectives, do not stand next 
to one another as objects of alternative choice, but they are connected by a 
more fundamental relationship. The unifying element of Aristotle’s 
conception is the element of activity, the actively lived life. The 
conception of life as energeia is suggested by the argumentation as early as 
in Chapter 7 of Book I, where Aristotle is looking for the ergon of man, 
                                                 
30 Why living a life based on phronêsis is not enough? Here is what A. Rorty has to say on 
the subject: «Theoria can complete and perfect the practical life, making it not only self-
justified but self-contained because its grounds are contained within it» (RORTY 1978, 
350). 
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i.e. a specific activity appropriate to man as man31. Aristotle at the same 
time demonstrates that this active, en-ergetic charge is present not only in 
political involvement, but also, in an even greater measure, in theoretical 
activity. 
The proposed analysis is also in harmony with the Aristotelian 
conception of ethical improvement, i.e. the conception of education on the 
principle of gradual progress. The space for education is, first and 
foremost, the polis. Again, let us point out that ethical virtues are above 
all political virtues, because self-rule, i.e. the state of man understanding 
oneself as an agent and choosing acts for their own sake, develops through 
submission to political rule32. In relation to reason it means that a man 
learns to obey his own reason by first listening to and obeying someone 
else’s reason – as a child the reason of the adults, as an adult most of all 
the reason of the law33. What is at first merely potentially reasonable 
conduct may thus through habituation and subsequent reflection become 
fully reasonable conduct which the agent understands as good and 
beautiful. 
Habituation is an important stage of ethical development; however, it is 
not its final stage34. Aristotle’s analyses allow for gradual improvement 
with a better understanding of ethical motivation playing the key role, and 
this understanding comes from rational reflection. It is this understanding 
that opens the path to the above explored realisation of one’s own life as 
energeia. Therefore, the essential grounding of theôria in the space of 
political life which the proposed interpretation tried to follow valorises 
                                                 
31 The counterpart to the active conduct of life is inactivity comparable to the passivity of a 
sleeping person, which is an image Aristotle uses repeatedly to underline his distinction 
(NE 1095b 32-1096a 2; 1098b 32-1099a 6; 1178b 19-20). 
32 GARVER 2006, 130. Conversely, individual vices make political participation impossible 
because through them people become too slave-like or too despotic, and hence they 
cannot take part in the political alternation of ruling and being ruled.  
33 The law is “wisdom without desire”, as Aristotle puts it in the Politics (Pol. 1287a 33). 
34 Cf. NUSSBAUM 2001, 285-287. 
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Aristotle’s central thesis of the political embedding of human life, as well 
as his thesis of the existence of the polis “for the good life” (Pol. 1252b 
30). 
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